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The recent financial crisis in the U.S. has been characterized by declining asset values 
and increasing levels of credit default in the banking sector. Bank losses and insolvency, declines 
in credit availability, damaged investor confidence, and decreased capacity of borrowers to repay 
loans have all had a negative impact on banks during this period. Although community banks do 
not manage the complicated financial products or the large portfolios of home loans that have 
precipitated the financial crisis, they are becoming more integrated into capital markets and they 
are not immune to the consequences of these adverse events. Community banks also typically 
have fewer resources with which to adjust to major changes in the financial marketplace.  
  One approach to this problem is for community banks to develop and apply methods of 
portfolio analysis and stress tests that provide them with timely information on their risk 
exposures and potential losses. The aim of these methods might be to maximize the expected 
return to the portfolio while keeping the risk exposure at acceptable levels. This approach 
requires the use of methods and tools that provide information on exposures and how to balance 
return and risk within the portfolio, how to calculate the levels of economic capital required, and 
how to set individual borrower and portfolio-level concentration limits. 
  Some banks have begun to develop formal methods and tools to assess risk exposure and 
perform stress tests of their portfolios, and large banks are further ahead in this effort. Yet, all 
banks are being driven by economic uncertainty to do more to assess their portfolio risks. An 
additional driver of this process is bank regulatory and supervisory agencies that are requiring 
banks to measure their credit risks and document the methods they use to monitor their loan 
portfolios and to establish their provisions for loan losses. In addition, as banks look to the 
interbank market for financing of their participation loans, the banks themselves are requiring 
more of this type of information from each other before entering into joint lending arrangements.    
 
Objective 
  In this paper we identify the gap between the existing research literature on this topic and 
the approaches and methods that community banks actually use to evaluate credit risk in their 
loan portfolios, particularly their agricultural portfolios. To reach that goal we propose to: 1) 
selectively review the research literature on bank agricultural portfolio risk analysis and 2)  
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identify the set of methods that community bankers currently use for portfolio risk analysis.  In a 
second paper we propose a methodology for portfolio analysis that will help to bridge the gap 
between what the research suggests be done and what bankers do.  In that paper we use visual 
portfolio analysis to illustrate how community bankers can analyze their risk exposure and 
migration patterns.    
  Section II of this paper is structured around a selective review of the applied research 
literature on credit risk analysis. Section III summarizes the methods that bankers report using 
when they conduct a portfolio risk analysis, e.g. trend or benchmark analysis (portfolio tracking) 
and stress-testing analysis (portfolio shocking). Section IV provides a set of concluding 
comments.     
 
II.  The Literature  
 
The research literature on portfolio risk analysis breaks down into roughly four segments: credit 




  Pederson and Chellappan (1991) provide the summary of a banker survey on credit 
scoring methods that agricultural bankers use.  The survey suggests that the primary reasons for 
developing credit scoring information on individual clients is to use it as a basis for a lending 
decision, for assessing risk in the overall loan portfolio, and for establishing borrower credit 
limits or interest rates. Based on that report, the characteristics that banks follow in their credit 
scoring models (and the percentage of banks using them) include: liquidity (100%), solvency 
(100%), collateral (100%), repayment capacity (100%), management ability and character of the 
borrower (52%), financial and operating efficiency (30%), profitability (16%), and various other 
factors (67%). The survey reveals a wide variety of formal and informal methods that banks use 
to develop credit scores for their agricultural clients.  
  Gustafson, Pederson and Gloy (2005) review the applied research literature and offer a 
synthesis of the advances in credit risk assessment. They review the applications of four 
alternative credit evaluation methods: linear probability analysis, discriminant analysis, probit  
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analysis, and logit analysis. These methods provide similar predictive power. In addition to 
controlling and monitoring credit risk exposure, they suggest that credit scoring models (CSMs) 
are useful in assisting in loan approval decisions, pricing loans in which differential interest rates 
are used to price for risk, and meeting regulatory requirements. The basic steps of developing a 
credit scoring model are: 
1.  identify the key factors that best distinguish borrower creditworthiness 
2.  choose appropriate measures for these variables 
3.  weight the variables according to their relative importance to the lender 
4.  score each loan as a weighted average of the respective variables, and  
5.  assign the credit scores to the appropriate classes of loans (or borrowers). 
 
Credit Risk Migration 
  Migration analysis is a relatively recent, probability-based measurement concept for 
credit risk that is consistent with the modern approaches to economic capital management by 
financial institutions, including those approaches contained in the proposed New Basel Accord 
(Crouhy, Galai, and Mark, 2000; Barry, 2001; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009). 
  Migration analysis is based on extrapolation into the future of historic rates of movement 
(i.e., transition probabilities) of individual loans among the classes of a lender’s risk-rating or 
credit-scoring system. One result of utilizing the migration concept is a richer, more 
comprehensive treatment of credit risk and loan losses than relying solely on the measurement of 
historic default rates. A migration analysis might evaluate how macroeconomic variables such as 
farmland value, aggregate money supply, the S&P500 index, the long-term interest rate, or 
consumer prices potentially influence loan risk migration.  
  According to Stokes and Gloy (2007) the functions of credit risk migration analysis are 
  to predict behavior for a class of loans,  
  to evaluate effectiveness of and compliance with existing credit policies and risk scoring, 
  to identify the risk-rating thresholds at which payoffs or recoveries diminish, 
  to calibrate models for probability of default and loss given default, and 
  to validate the reserve for future loan losses.   
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Based on a Markov chain model, they use an entropy-based econometric technique to calculate 
the probability of default of the transition probabilities in a mortgage portfolio.  
  Barry, Escalante, and Ellinger (2002), Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto (2000), and Bangia, 
Diebold, Kronimus, Schagen and Schuermann (2002) show that the transition probability of 
retaining the current risk rating is the highest, and these probabilities decrease as the distance 
between risk classes increases.  For example, the probabilities of a farm business migrating to a 
“near” class are higher than the probabilities of migrating to a “far” class, and they exhibit a 
higher tendency to downgrade than upgrade. Bangia et al. and Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto 
show that transition probabilities should be based on some conditioning factors, such as 
geographical location of company, type of industry, and macroeconomic business cycle.  
  Phillips and Katchova (2004) use the Markov property of independence to test for “path 
dependence” in risk migration data. They find that among farm businesses the Markov property 
of independence is violated.  During the expansion phase, the retention rate of the highest risk 
class is significantly lower than the unconditional retention rate. However, during the recession 
phase the retention rate for the highest class is significantly higher than the unconditional 
retention rate. Their results are consistent with those of previous studies that analyze transition 
probabilities. Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto find that transition probabilities of bonds exhibit a 
higher tendency to upgrade during an expansion but a higher tendency to downgrade during 
recession. Phillips and Katchova find that the significant transition probabilities in the downward 
trend and upward trend matrices exhibit a pattern of trend reversal. This means that a downgrade 
in credit quality last period would more likely result in an upgrade in credit quality over the next 
period in comparison to an unconditional upgrade. The opposite pattern is present in the upward 
trend matrix. 
  Escalante, Barry, Park, and Demir (2004) find that larger farms are more likely to have 
credit upgrades. The risk migration matrices obtained in this study reflect the expected trend of 
lower class retention rates and highly volatile transition probabilities compared to results 
obtained for bonds and other publicly traded securities.  Their results show that farm-level 
factors do not have a large impact on the probability of credit risk migration, but macroeconomic 
factors do. For example farm real estate values represent a growing economy and a greater 
likelihood of class upgrades. The relaxation of credit constraints through higher levels of money  
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supply has a similar positive effect on credit risk migration, while a higher interest rate has a 
negative effect on migration patterns. 
  Behrens and Pederson (2007) use conditional migration matrices to evaluate path 
dependence, loan size, and loan seasoning in a large agricultural loan portfolio. They measure 
risk migration by generating the migration matrix, which has an initial and ending rating, to 
show the direction and distance of migration.  If loans were previously downgraded, the 
probability of another downgrade is larger than if the loans had been previously upgraded. 
Retention rates for the highest quality class are generally the largest. They find also that a trend 
reversal pattern exists.  Also, they examine the influence of previous migrations on future 
migrations for individual loans and alternative lengths of time since origination of the loan. 
  Loans that migrate in a previous period are more likely to migrate again in the next 
period, but this is statistically significant only in high credit quality classes. Small loans are less 
likely to migrate than median-sized loans and median-sized loans are less likely to migrate than 
large loans. Unseasoned (new) farm loans are more likely to migrate than seasoned farm loans 
and unseasoned loans have a higher probability of downgrading than seasoned loans.  
  Deng, Escalante, Barry and Yu (2007) use a time-homogeneous Markov chain model and 
a time-inhomogeneous model to analyze farm credit migration compared to the discrete-time 
model.  Farm borrower financial information is usually reported on an annual basis and farm 
lenders typically use multi-year averages when doing credit risk assessment. This may lead to a 
failure to identify transient changes in the borrower’s credit risk quality. The resulting cohort 
model tends to estimate lower default probability than a Markov model. 
  Gloy, LaDue and Gunderson (2005) examine credit risk migration using lender risk 
ratings.  They find that these lender ratings are more stable (less likely to migrate) than ratings 
that are based on credit scores derived from financial statements. They suggest that nonfinancial 
factors play an important role in assessing credit risk. In addition they use regression analysis to 
identify several factors that influence the likelihood of credit downgrades.  Those factors include 
the borrower’s risk tier, personal characteristics, and the stage of the business life cycle.  
Interestingly, the primary agricultural enterprise type does not appear to have a significant 




Credit Risk Portfolio Models  
  Portfolio models of credit risk exposure do not focus on producing credit scores. Rather, 
the emphasis is placed on estimating the level of default risk exposure in sub-portfolios and the 
correlation between those sub-portfolio segments in terms of their likelihood of default. 
  Zech and Pederson (2004) use a probability density function approach for calculating 
portfolio-level loan loss. The key inputs of the expected loss function are the probability of 
default, the loss given default, the exposure at default, and the time horizon (typically one year). 
Economic capital is approximated as the tail percentile that represents the total amount of risk 
less the expected loss covered by the loan loss reserve. The shape of the portfolio probability 
density function is dependent on the portfolio composition: loan default probabilities, relative 
loan sizes, correlations of default between loans, and concentrations by the number of loans and 
sector or industry. 
  They provide a summary of the four major credit risk models KMV Portfolio Manager, 
Credit Metrics, Credit Portfolio View and CreditRisk+.  They argue that the Credit Risk+ model 
is a better model for agricultural lenders. The Credit Risk+ model is enhanced by using an 
alternative solution algorithm and by accounting for correlations between sectors. Model inputs 
are the net loan loss exposure, default rates and their volatilities, and correlations of loan default 
between industries. The model output is the expected loan loss (EL) and the unexpected loan loss 
(UL), each of which can be decomposed into loan risk contributions by industry or portfolio 
segment. The model generates portfolio, sub-portfolio, and loan-level risk measures. They use 
lender historical data to calculate risk migration. The effect of loan risk migration is included in 
the estimates of default rates and volatilities. The paper also uses historical data to estimate 
correlations between industry defaults. Stress-testing is done with the model to compare the base 
scenario to alternative high- and low-stress scenarios when the loan risk ratings and loss given 
default (LGD) ratings change. 
  Katchova and Barry (2005) develop a credit risk model based on Merton’s pricing 
approach. That is, default occurs when a farmer misses a debt payment, but if the farm is solvent 
the debt can be refinanced. The paper illustrates how to calculate probability of default (PD), loss 
given default (LGD), expected loss (EL), and unexpected loss (UL) using farm-level business 
reporting data and several additional assumptions about the credit scoring model used by an  
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agricultural lender in order to estimate the PD parameters. They include calculation of the 
standard deviation of default and default correlations. The statistical probability of default for 
each farm is calculated using the probabilities of the normal distribution as the probability that 
assets will fall below the level of debt. The average probability of default is calculated as the 
weighted average of the probability of default for all farms, weighted by the debt for each farm. 
Some studies use historical data to calculate PD. This can be calculated as either the percent 
debts in default or as the percent of farms in default. The loss-based method uses historical data 
on default and loss given default. 
  Katchova and Barry classify borrowers into credit quality classes. As in most credit risk 
models, the advantage of credit quality classes is that the grouping of homogeneous borrowers 
allows more precise estimation of PD and LGD. The disadvantages are that the precision of 
assigning borrowers into the appropriate credit quality classes decreases and that a large number 
of observations are needed to obtain reliable results for each credit quality class. Unlike Credit 
Metrics, which uses data from rating agencies with established credit quality classes, KMV uses 
endogenous models to group borrowers. The average PD is calculated as the statistical 
probability of default and as the historical default rate. A statistical PD is calculated for each 
farm using the properties of the normal distribution and the farm values of assets, debt, and 
standard deviation of assets. The LGD is calculated for each defaulting farm as the percentage 
shortfall of recovered assets below the level of debt. The probability of default and losses are 
shown to vary among credit quality classes. 
  Pederson and Zech (2009) suggest that Merton-type models require lenders to employ 
relatively strong assumptions about the underlying stochastic process for agricultural asset prices 
and what constitutes a default event in an agricultural loan portfolio. They propose an alternative 
model based on CreditRisk+ that is adaptable for agricultural lenders.  
  The CreditRisk+ model allows lenders to estimate the probability distributions of credit 
losses conditional on portfolio composition by using lender historical loan data, adjusting the PD 
and LGD for risk migration and variation through the economic cycle of the agricultural industry, 
and incorporating correlation relationships between identifiable sectors in the loan portfolio. The 
LGD rate is determined by loan-specific characteristics (e.g., collateral or guarantees). PD for 
each exposure is determined by the borrower’s risk rating, as evaluated by the lender. The  
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variance of the portfolio PD is represented by the sum of two risks, systematic risk and 
nonsystematic risk. Systematic risk is due to correlated defaults in the portfolio caused by the 
risk factors. Nonsystematic risk is borrower-specific risk. The loan loss allowance requirement is 
equal to the mean of the loss distribution (the expected loss), while the economic capital 
requirement is equal to the tail percentage minus the mean. Pederson and Zech illustrate the 
value of expected loss and the unexpected loss of the portfolio as the area under the loan loss 
distribution curve. The paper uses the farmer bankruptcy rate as an indicator of economic cycles 
in agriculture.  This is because the estimated PDs should reflect a long run estimate of default 
over the economic cycle, which is necessary for implementing the New Basel Accord. They use 
value-at-risk (VaR) to measure the level of economic capital required at various levels of 
confidence.  
  Peura and Jokivuolle (2004) also use probabilistic value-at-risk (VaR) type criterion to 
measure the sufficiency of actual bank capital against minimum capital requirements over a 
defined horizon. This method of stress-testing is an extension of a typical credit portfolio model, 
simulating actual bank capital and minimum capital requirements simultaneously. The required 
capital buffer is measured given a confidence level for capital adequacy chosen by bank 
management.  
 
Portfolio-level Simulation Models 
  Pederson and Wilberding (1999) explore the methods developed by McKinley and 
Barrickman (1994) to decompose portfolio credit risk into: transaction risk, intrinsic risk, and 
concentration risk. Transaction risks are those associated with individual clients and they are 
captured by each borrower’s credit risk rating. Intrinsic risk is identified at the sub-portfolio level 
by industry type (e.g., some of agricultural bank customers mainly produce dairy or grain 
products) or by line of business (e.g., operating loans, mortgages). Concentration risk looks at 
the largest line of business, or by industry, or by largest borrowers. This method produces a risk 
profile of the bank and a numerical index score which can be compared across different 
transaction, intrinsic and concentration risk profiles. It also provides a means for assessing risk 
exposure at the sub-portfolio level (e.g. dairy). The paper also illustrates the use of stress-testing 
by allocating risks into a systematic category (driven by economy-wide factors) and a 
nonsystematic category (driven by the characteristics of individual firms). The economy wide  
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factors may be policy shocks (e.g., monetary policy and farm policy) or productivity shocks (e.g., 
factor productivity, cost of energy).  
  Sakaimbo and Pederson (2011) develop an Excel-based empirical model that agricultural 
lenders might use to evaluate the capital requirement under the Basel Accord. It decomposes the 
correlation between PD and LGD into their systematic and nonsystematic components. The 
random variables are assumed to follow a standard-normal distribution. The analysis uses the 
Miu-Ozdemir (2005) model approach to calculate correlations between the factors, including PD 
and LGD for each borrower, the correlation due to systematic risk factors, and the correlation 
due to idiosyncratic risk factors.  Sakaimbo and Pederson subject a portfolio of borrowers to the 
same systematic risk, while allowing their respective idiosyncratic risks to change. They assume 
that variations in agricultural land values are a good indicator for the systematic risk factor, 
which drives PD and LGD at the industry and lender levels. They simulate the effects of an 
economic cycle on the agricultural lender’s portfolio and economic capital. 
  The model measures the correlations between land values and PD, between land values 
and LGD, and between PD and LGD. Initially, they assume that any individual borrower has a 
low-to-moderate borrower specific risk of default, and that the idiosyncratic risks are of equal 
magnitude. They also do stress testing for the loan portfolio by making specific percentage 
changes in land values. An interesting point is to evaluate the economic capital requirement as 
land values decline. For each percentage point decline, they evaluate the percentage mark-up of 
economic capital that is required to increase capital from the baseline level to that of the 
relatively stressed level. 
  Wehrspohn (2003) describes a visual portfolio simulation model in which it is possible to 
simulate credit risk exposure by loan segment, contributions to marginal risk, and the expected 
risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC) of the bank. Marginal risk exposure is identified at the 
segment (sub-portfolio) level, where risk contribution is measured as the marginal risk 
conditional on default of a specified portfolio segment. The model allows for a comparison of 
risk concentration with exposure concentration. Bankers can also set limits to risk concentration 
by not allowing concentration to exceed a designated percentage of the total risk in one segment.  
Wehrspohn visually combines these three indicators in one graph (see Figure 1). Size 
“bubbles” are used to illustrate the risk concentration of each segment and the bank can set  
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absolute exposure limits. The risk per exposure unit can also be set according to a limit. These 
combinations of exposure and marginal risk act as the bank’s early warning system of portfolio 
risk. 
Figure1: Risk versus exposure and risk concentration (Source: Wehrspohn, 2003, p. ___) 
 
 
  Wehrspohn defines the expected RAROC as the contractual interest rate less the cost of 
refinancing, operating expenses, cost of default risk, and the cost of equity-target return on 
equity. The amount of economic capital is calculated from the marginal value-at-risk. 
Wehrspohn illustrates RAROC and three types of limits in one plot. The model allows one to set 
three types of limits: the “RAROC limit” (the bank’s target return on equity), the “stop loss 
limit” (the intended target return on equity), and the “destruction limit” (the expected return on 
equity when it becomes negative). Wehrspohn combines these graphically to visually identify the 
risk-return trade-off that exists in the credit portfolio. 
  The visual approach to bank portfolio simulation as developed by Wehrspohn is unique. 
Although the examples he provides use bond portfolios, the tool would presumably allow banks 
to develop their own segments based on their portfolio structure. Thus, banks may choose to 
evaluate different industries and different loan types. The input requirements of the model (at the 
segment level) include estimates of default probability, total exposure, amounts of guarantees  
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and unsecured exposures, loss given default, and correlation within segments. Thus, a bank may 
include information about the correlation structure and capture the effect of systematic risk 
within each sector. This model approach may be adaptable for community banks, as they may 
lack sufficient historical data to apply other credit risk models that have more stringent data 
requirements.  
 
III.  The Methods Bankers Use 
  The preceding summary of the research literature shows that there are several methods 
and tools that can be implemented in portfolio analysis.  Yet, it is equally important to 
investigate how smaller community banks actually perform portfolio risk analysis. In this section 
we explore if there is a gap between the tools that are provided in the research literature and what 
these bankers currently do in practice.   
  In order to discuss this question and better understand how community banks work, we 
performed a nonrandom survey of eight community banks in the Midwest to learn about what 
they do when they assess credit risk and what their attitude is toward portfolio risk analysis. Our 
summary is based on seven bank responses. We believe these responses are representative of 
community banks in the region. 
  Generally, community banks reveal that an interim portfolio analysis helps them predict 
how the current year’s profitability is going.  It may be used also to make some predictions about 
the next year. More specifically, bank respondents want to determine if the upcoming year will 
be a challenge for their customers. Bankers also respond that portfolio risk analysis helps them to 
identify credit concentrations which they may track as an early warning system.  
  In our survey of community banks, the most often reported tools are generally credit risk 
scoring, watch lists, stress tests, and trend (benchmark) analyses. The banks respond that the 
analysis is aimed at reducing or eliminating risk in certain areas to manage the overall risk 
exposure in the bank. They indicate that these efforts to assess risk help them to develop early 






Why might banks use stress analysis?  
  The objective of a stress test is to understand the sensitivity of the portfolio to changes in 
various specific risk factors in the bank. The results of a stress test may focus on measure of 
bank performance or on the performance of clients of the bank.  Bankers also use trend (or 
benchmark) analysis to identify high risk customers. Here the performance of an individual client 
may be compared to their own past performance (to observe deviations from trend), or a 
reference group (a peer group, or benchmark), or the whole portfolio.    
  Stress-testing has become a standard risk assessment technique for banks. Banks use 
stress tests to understand the firm’s risk profile and communicate with senior management. It can 
be used to forecast financial conditions of the bank, as well as to obtain relatively early warnings 
of unusual performance. Stress-testing can help banks to set lending limits, to allocate capital, 
and to enter into hedge positions.  
  A stress test of bank performance is commonly described as an evaluation of a bank’s 
financial position under a severe, but plausible, scenario. The methods of stress testing are 
designed: 1) to assess changes in asset quality (e.g., forecast future levels of past-due loans), 2) 
to evaluate past deviations and spot potential problems (using residual analysis), and 3) to assess 
changes in risk sensitivity of assets (i.e., to stress-test assets). Stress testing is also used to refer 
not only to the mechanics of applying specific individual tests, but also to the wider environment 
(scenarios) within which the tests are developed, evaluated, and used. The information provided 
by a set of stress tests can also help to identify weaknesses in data collection, reporting systems, 
and risk management.  
  It appears that stress testing has become an integral part of risk assessment and bank 
management strategy. By interpreting the results of stress tests, banks can take into account their 
position in the market, their particular approach to stress test implementation, and the strategic 
aspects of risk management. And it may act as a cross-check for other types of analyses. Stress 
testing alerts bank management to adverse unexpected outcomes related to a variety of risks and 
provides an indication of how much capital might be needed to absorb losses if large shocks 
occur. While stress tests provide an indication of the appropriate level of capital necessary to 
endure deteriorating economic conditions, a bank alternatively may employ other actions in 
order to help mitigate increasing levels of risk.  
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   Stress tests can include existing and potential market, credit, operational, and liquidity 
risks.  The object of stress-testing could be asset values, profit and loss, economic capital 
requirements, liquidity, or counterparty risk exposure. Reverse stress tests start from a known 
stress test outcome (such as breaching regulatory capital ratios, illiquidity or insolvency) and 
then asking what events could lead to such an outcome for the bank. As part of the overall stress 
testing program, it is usual to include some extreme scenarios which would threaten the viability 
of the bank. 
  A sensitivity stress test measures the impact on a portfolio’s value of a large change in a 
particular asset or in a smaller change that affects a number of correlated asset prices (assets 
whose prices tend to change together and exhibit covariant risk). One of the standard sensitivity 
stress tests used by risk managers measures the effect of a parallel shift in the yield curve that has 
an impact on the yields of short- and long-term bonds. Similarly, a sensitivity test might explore 
the impact of varying percentage declines in commodity prices or increases in interest rates on 
loans. A stress test scenario can be based on a significant market event in the past (a historical 
scenario) or on a plausible market event that has yet to happen (a hypothetical scenario). 
   
How do surveyed bankers use stress analysis?  
  Based on responses to our small survey of community bankers, we can categorize how 
banks use stress testing in two ways: individual customer stress testing or stress testing a sector 
or industry.  The results of stress testing can help banks manage their customers especially which 
fall into a higher risk categories. The survey shows that they obtain enough financial information 
for all of their customers annually to be able to stress test what they feel is appropriate. 
  Some banks first do individual (customer or loan) risk ratings and then, based on the 
resulting risk categorization, they do stress testing.  Bankers indicate that individual risk ratings 
are often based on prior year actual profit (loss), current balance sheet information, and current 
loan-to-value ratio information. One banker indicates that this is done on an actual year-end basis 
and also on a projected (pro-forma) basis. This yields a new risk rating after the loan is made 
which can sway the rating given the size of the transaction. An example from one bank is a 
young farmer with good net worth position and limited debt could have a low risk level, but after 
purchasing land (and borrowing most of the purchase price) his score changes to a high risk level  
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due to a lack of equity and a high loan-to-value ratio. After risk ratings are done, banks indicate 
that they perform individual stress tests on an annual basis at the time the credit is reviewed for 
the coming year’s credit requests. The survey responses generally suggest that the criteria for the 
stress tests are established at least annually.  
  Some banks do other kinds of stress testing on a weekly basis and then use the results 
along with a watch list. The methods banks use to stress-test may combine a “what-if analysis” 
with an evaluation of past deviations. For example, one community bank performs “shock tests” 
each week, testing and then back testing, and risk assessment is done annually on individual 
clients. This community bank tracks and monitors changes in the whole loan portfolio. The 
surveyed banks respond that a watch list is extremely important to keep tabs on high risk credits 
throughout the year.    
  Survey banks also do stress testing at the sector or industry level. Some banks assess risks 
based on North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code.
1 The NAICS code 
classification allows a bank to track delinquency and loss trends by industry so that stress testing 
can be implemented selectively on high-risk industries.  One bank indicates that all nonconsumer 
loans are coded with NAICS codes to measure industry concentrations which allow the stressed 
industries to surface via the risk rating scores. 
  Bank respondents indicate that the subsector designation carries with it important 
information about income potential.  For example, one bank knows that the grain industry has 
been performing well in the recent past, while the swine and dairy sectors have experienced 
significant financial stress. For this reason they assess many agricultural industries at least 
annually.  One bank reveals that its agricultural industry portfolio is segmented by product (i.e., 
almonds, feeder livestock, ethanol, dairy, hogs, crop production, vineyards, etc.).  Though the 
survey respondents do not specifically mention how they do stress testing or trend analysis at the 
sector or subsector level, they likely stress test subsectors where earnings are under downward 
                                                            
1 The NAICS is the standard used by Federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for 
the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy. 
NAICS was developed under the auspices of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and adopted 
in 1997 to replace the Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC) code.  
17 
 
pressure or where high loan concentrations exist. Surveyed banks monitor this through the loan 
concentration report where they break the portfolio down into several subsectors.    
  To sum up, the surveyed banks provide general indications on the information and the 
factors they track as they stress their loan portfolios. These stress tests are performed at least 
annually. Banks do stress testing on their portfolios at the individual level based on credit scores, 
and at the industry level by focusing on the high risk segments of their portfolios. Based on the 
results of their stress analysis they may form a watch list for monitoring purposes, use the results 
to manage high risk loans, or use the results to determine if more capital is needed.   
  Some banks appear to use NAICS code designators to capture “macro factors” when 
performing stress tests, but there is no common approach in use. An example is found in the 
dairy industry portfolio at one of the responding banks where dairy loans are monitored due to 
the current low level of milk prices. Yet, the bank really wants to obtain information about how 
economic conditions will change in that sector (i.e., industry outlook or guidance). Some banks 
also mention that other economic factors are important drivers of their approach to risk 
assessment, such as the foreclosure rate, regional unemployment rate, etc. 
 
How do surveyed bankers use trend (benchmark) analysis? 
  Banks use benchmark analysis to help them identify high risk customers. Surveyed banks 
indicate that segregating borrowers within an industry highlights the weakest borrowers. One 
bank mentions that benchmarking allows them to concentrate on the extent to which 
improvement is required or there is a need to develop an exit strategy if the level of risk appears 
to be excessive for individual borrowers or for subgroups of similar borrowers. 
  Surveyed banks use a variety of tools to perform trend/benchmark analyses and they use 
various databases to track information, analyze trends, and share information. Several of the 
surveyed banks use similar loan information systems to track information across loan segments.  
For example, one bank responds that the same factors are used in the commercial loans and 
agricultural loans, but they apply different weights to these factors. 
  One bank responds that it shows the results of benchmarking to its customers to let them 
know how they compare to others in their peer group. The bank responds that over time, 
individual borrowers can learn about what changes they made that caused their competitive  
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position to change and areas in which to concentrate in order to improve their position. The bank 
creates this “dashboard report” and offers it to their customers. The report includes graphs that 
compare each customer’s financial trends to an average of the rest of their portfolio and also by 
location.   
  Some banks respond that they do benchmark analysis to let their staff know which clients 
require more attention. For example, one bank indicates that by benchmarking individuals 
against the portfolio on a quarterly basis, they can “earmark” borrowers that may cause a loss to 
the bank. After doing benchmarking, some of them banks create watch lists.  One bank reveals 
that it has weekly loan committee meetings that address all watch, substandard, and doubtful 
credits throughout their entire bank.    
 
Do community banks have special needs? 
  Based on the survey responses, there is a common core set of needs among banks. For 
example, they use national economic factors and industry trends as part of their approach to 
adjusting the general allowance for loan loss.  They also want to be able to access more detailed 
information about national economic conditions sooner so that risks can be mitigated earlier. 
Also, banks reveal that it would be helpful to be able to easily do more analysis by enterprise, 
county, land type, etc.   
  For retail loans one bank uses its historical charge-offs and performs calculations to make 
additional allowances as needed. Some banks indicate that they want to know what factors to use 
when determining an adequate loan loss reserve amount. Surveyed banks also indicate that they 
want to know more about how to determine the likelihood of loan default and loss given default, 
and how those apply to stressed industries and different loan types. These factors are important 
when determining the adequacy of the bank’s capital position. 
  None of the banks report using a formal credit risk portfolio model. And they do not 
estimate the probability of default, loan recovery rates or loss given default, indicators of credit 
risk migration, or the correlation relationship between loans. Yet, generally bankers respond that 




  Banks use different kinds of software to perform their risk assessments. Among those 
reported are Web Equity, ViewPoint, FisCal (commercial), FINPACK (agricultural), and 
Microsoft Access. While banks may combine the use of several tools most of them use Microsoft 
Excel. Some banks use Access and Excel jointly to manage their loan data base and perform 
stress and benchmark analyses. A primary challenge in this regard is having the tools to easily 
access loan information and put it in a form that allows for analysis. Web Equity accomplishes 
some of that task. 
   
IV. Conclusions 
    We find that there are significant gaps between what community bankers indicate they 
are doing to assess credit portfolio risk and what the research literature provides. While several 
of the methods that are identified in the research literature are not used by smaller community 
banks, this specific gap is not amenable to a simple explanation. Banks perform stress analysis, 
trend analysis, and create watch lists of loans and clients.  These banks typically do not perform 
a portfolio level risk analysis, as described in the research literature. So, what are some 
characteristics of the types of methods and tools that might help to fill that perceived gap? 
  The survey indicates that bankers already do stress testing based various scenarios and 
other factors.  So, the facility to perform stress tests should be a feature of any risk assessment 
tool. These stress tests should be performed at the individual borrower (loan) level, at the sub-
portfolio level, and at the aggregate bank portfolio level. In addition the research literature is 
relatively silent on which factors to use in stress testing, which measures of portfolio 
performance should be stressed, or what specific methods to use when performing stress tests.  
The typical approach to stress testing in the literature is to generate a value-at-risk (VaR) 
measure, yet most small banks do not estimate such a measure even though it is relatively easy to 
do.  What other measures of risk exposure might be equally, or more, useful? 
  From the survey, we know that community bankers want to understand their risk 
exposure in the agricultural industry.  Yet, conditions in agriculture can differ greatly due to a 
number of factors including the volatility of farm commodity and input prices. Also, there are 
potentially important sources of systematic (correlation or covariance) risk that are present at the 
subsector level and across borrowers. So, risk assessment tools and methods should incorporate  
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elements of the correlation structure that reflect this degree of interdependence at the whole 
portfolio, at the subsector portfolio, and at the individual borrower (loan) levels of exposure.  
  Finally, the particular measures of portfolio performance that a bank evaluates should 
consider the trade-off between portfolio risk and expected profitability. The profit side is 
potentially captured by measures such as risk-adjusted return (or risk-adjusted return on 
economic capital) or expected value added. On the risk side, the measure could be a marginal 
risk indicator, or an indicator of the likelihood of default. When identifying these measures and 
developing the tools that produce them, it is also important to realize that community banks may 
lack sufficient data to implement some of the risk assessment tools that are found in the research 
literature. 
  In a second paper we will propose a methodology for portfolio analysis that will help to 
bridge the gap between what the research suggests be done and what bankers do.  In that paper 
we use visual portfolio analysis to illustrate how community bankers can analyze their risk 
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